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Introduction
With the collapse of the crawling peg exchange rate regimes in many emerging economies following the 1997 Asian …nancial crisis, a view characterizing the "hollowing out of the middle ground"for exchange rate regimes gained acceptance. Fischer (2001) , for example, argued that intermediate exchange rate regimes were prone to crises and unsustainable over the long run. A number of countries, including Brazil, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and Turkey adopted de jure ‡oating exchange rate policies. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) note that the central banks of these countries were driven by a "fear of ‡oating"that led them to exchange-rate management regimes geared to accumulation of large war chests of foreign currency. In a subsequent survey article, Frankel (2003) found the vanishing-middle-ground proposition somewhat illusory as most of its feared consequences never materialized.
Unlike the Asian crisis, the initial shock from the recent global liquidity crisis originated in developed countries. The challenge for central banks in developing countries, which hold most of their reserves in currencies of developed countries, was to manage their exchange rates against these currencies. Among the many ideas of how to address global imbalances and reduce the risk of devaluations of major reserve currencies, the IMF recently suggested that central banks use a currency basket for reserve accumulation. 1 The proposal is essentially a rehash of the proposals of Dornbusch and Park (1999) and Williamson (2000) , who argue that basket targeting suits ‡oat-averse countries still wanting to use exchange rates to absorb the brunt of external shocks. Beijing. 2 The appropriateness of abandoning the US dollar as the sole anchor currency has been a recurrent topic of discussion in many oil-exporting Gulf countries, especially after the dollar lost value against other major currencies in the lead-up to the global liquidity crisis.
and weights of the currencies in the basket. The central bank further featured a liberalized capital account that allowed domestic banks and …rms to resort to external borrowing without regulatory constraints. Given the absence of developed sterilizing facilities, liquidity in Russia's domestic money market is highly dependent on funding conditions abroad.
The exchange rate policy shift in Russia provides an ideal natural experiment for investi- "decoupling" and "recoupling" in the course of the recent global liquidity crisis. 3 Thus, we are presented with an opportunity to evaluate the resilience of the basket-targeting regime to external shocks during both stages. Using daily data on interest rates, exchange rates, and sovereign CDS spreads, I examine di¤erent exchange rate regimes over di¤erent time periods with separately estimated models. Policy conclusions are drawn from comparison of estimation results across samples.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the Russian exchange rate policy during the time period under investigation; Section 3 outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the paper and describes the empirical strategy used; the results of the estimation made are reported in Section 4; and Section 5 concludes. 3 The term "decoupling" originally referred to the business cycle dynamics of developed and developing countries (Kose et al., 2008) . Decoupling here is slightly more speci…c, referring to the disconnect between …nancial market performance in developed and developing countries during the …rst stage of the recent global …nancial crisis. "Recoupling" here refers to the reaction of developing countries to the insecurity of global …nancial markets after the Lehman Brothers collapse. As noted above, most countries that switched to basket currency targeting (e.g. Malaysia,
China, and Kuwait) do not disclose the currency weights in their baskets. This was due in part to the fact that their policy changes were motivated by maintaining competitiveness in relation to their main trading partners. The CBR, on the other hand, wants to be public about the weights in the bi-currency basket. In the short-term, the central bank wants to increase exchange rate ‡exibility of the ruble against the basket components. 4 It further wants to bolster the credibility of its longer-term commitments to implementing a free- ‡oating exchange rate tax revenues from oil and gas exports, has become the main instrument for absorbing foreign currency ‡ows in Russia. 5 The CBR also began to issue its own bonds and interest-bearing deposits in order to sterilize foreign currency interventions. However, due to the small-scale use of such borrowing relative to the scope of foreign currency ‡ows, the day-to-day impact of sterilization operations on liquidity of the domestic money market has been limited. 4 See Appendix B for a rolling standard deviation measure of volatility for the RUB/EUR and RUB/USD exchange rates. 5 In February 2008, the Stabilization Fund was divided into a Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund.
3 Theory, data description, and empirical strategy provide evidence that domestic interest rates in countries that pursue exchange-rate targeting are more correlated with foreign interest rates of anchor countries than in countries with free‡oating exchange-rate regimes.
Using this model to study the Russian case, I extend the Obstfeld et al. (2005) bi-variable analysis of domestic and foreign interest rates across exchange rate regimes to a vector of four variables that includes an exchange rate and a sovereign CDS risk premium series:
This extension is motivated by the facts that the CBR pursued de jure managed ‡oating exchange rate policies throughout the entire observation period of 2001-2009 and that capital ‡ows were essentially unrestricted.
For analysis purposes, the Russian domestic money market is represented by the MosIBOR interest rate on 1-month interbank deposits. This key interest rate for the Russian money market is set according to quotes by principal Russian banks. Foreign rates are represented by 1-month LIBOR for deposits denominated in USD and EUR. Besides using the observed USD/RUR and EUR/RUR exchange rates, I synthetically compose a bi-currency basket using o¢ cially announced basket weights of the two currencies. The sovereign risk premium is measured by the price of 5-year sovereign CDS contracts on Russian external debt. 6 As the sterilization capabilities of a central bank are limited, I assume the domestic money market is a¤ected by external shocks caused by foreign currency ‡ows through current and capital accounts. In such an environment, domestic interest rates are contemporaneously correlated with exchange rate as the central bank's foreign currency interventions lead to ‡uctuations in money supply. I further assume that a switch to basket targeting changes the way external 6 5-year CDS contracts not only are the most liquid segment of the market but also the most frequently used benchmark in other studies (Pan and Singleton, 2008) .
shocks are transmitted to the domestic money market and the relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates.
The sovereign risk premium is a good indicator of capital mobility in terms of capital accessibility; it re ‡ects both the actual costs of external borrowing for the private sector and foreign investors'perception of sovereign risk. The premium a¤ects capital account ‡ows and the dynamics of the domestic money market as the central bank sterilization abilities are limited. Most of the existing literature on the relationship between country risk premium and the degree of capital mobility tries to identify the premium either by decomposing cross-country interest rate di¤erentials or by comparing yields on domestic debt and yields on foreign-currency- 
Data description
The data set here includes daily observations over 7 The intial jumps after adoption of the bi-currency basket re ‡ect the graduated increases in the euro component. 
Dynamics of 1-month MosIBOR and LIBOR interest rates
Empirical strategy
The ADF tests reported in Tables A2-A3 in Appendix A reports the trace statistics of the Johansen's cointegrating rank test for four variables in vector Y t . While we can strongly reject the rank of cointegration to be equal to one, it is not possible to rule out the hypothesis of exactly two cointegrating vectors. I
conclude that there are two cointegrating relationships between the four variables in the study.
Although the "decoupling" sample is an exception, I apply the same VEC methodology used for the other periods. Although we cannot interpret the identi…ed cointegrating vectors as a long-run equilibrium relationship, it seems reasonable to view the estimated coe¢ cients as partial correlations between variables of the system.
The next logical step is to estimate the just-identi…ed VEC model with Johansen's normalization procedure. The restrictions on the two cointegrating vectors are intended to capture the relationship between the domestic money market rate MosIBOR and the USD/RUR exchange rate, on the one side, and externally determined factors such as the LIBOR rate and the CDS spread, on the other. 
where measures the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium relationship and is the longrun slope coe¢ cient or the levels relationship. I use a speci…cation with an unrestricted vector of constants to allow for a linear trend in the undi¤erenced data.
I impose the Johansen normalization procedure and identify two cointegrating vectors. The …rst is a level relationship of the MosIBOR, LIBOR, and USD/RUR rates within the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) framework. The second cointegrating vector captures the relationship between the USD/RUR exchange rate and external factors.
In addition to the long-run just identifying restrictions on coe¢ cients, I also impose a restriction on the adjustment coe¢ cients for the row of LIBOR rates because we do not expect the LIBOR rates to adjust to an equilibrium relationship with the Russia-speci…c variables of the system.
First cointegrating equation
The relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates depends on the degree of exchange rate regime ‡exibility as de…ned by Mundell-Fleming's policy trilemma.
The relationship between domestic interest rate and exchange rate depends on the sterilization capabilities of the central bank, which, as previously noted, are limited in the CBR's case.
Consider, for example, a current account shock due to the positive dynamics of commodity prices. Under a de jure managed ‡oat, the dollar in ‡ow should result in ruble strengthening against the dollar (USD/RUR goes down). However, in the absence of a proper sterilizing mechanism, the dollar in ‡ow leads to domestic money supply expansion and downward pressure on domestic MosIBOR interest rates. As a result, external terms-of-trade shocks result in a positive relationship between the exchange rate and domestic interest rate.
Second cointegrating equation
The second cointegrating equation captures the relationship between exchange rate and external factors. The sovereign risk premium literature points out that the factors that determine the premium could be of internal and external origin. 4 Empirical results
US dollar as operating target
The …rst sample period runs from September 4, 2001 to February 2, 2005. During this period, the CBR used the USD/RUR exchange rate as an operating target. The estimation results for di¤erent time periods are reported in Table 1 . All beta coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant and have an expected sign. The signs of the short-run adjustment coe¢ cients indicate that the variables of the system returned to identi…ed long-run equilibrium relationships. given variable and a variable whose coe¢ cient was chosen by the Johansen's normalization procedure to be constrained to unity. On the opposite, a positive sign of the coe¢ cient indicates a negative relationship between the two variables.
As expected under the policy of USD targeting and free capital ‡ows, we …nd a positive cointegrating relationship between the domestic interest rate and the LIBOR interest rate.
Also in the absence of a sterilization mechanism, the exchange rate is positively related to the domestic money market rate and to the sovereign risk premium.
The "No Crisis" Period
The To determine if this actually occurred, I estimate the VEC speci…cation (1) on two sets of variables. One set is represented by the USD/RUR exchange rate and the LIBOR interest rate for USD deposits; the other is based on synthetically composed exchange and interest rates.
Since the weights of the bi-currency basket of EUR and USD are publicly announced, I can apply these weights to the observed time-series for the EUR/RUR and USD/RUR exchange rates, as well as to the LIBOR rates for deposits denominated in USD and EUR. The estimation results for the period are reported in the upper and lower panels of Table 2 . Note: ** Denotes signi…cance at 5% *** Signi…cance at 1%
As can be seen from the …rst cointegrating equation of the upper panel, the domestic MosI-BOR interest rate is not related to either the USD-denominated LIBOR rate or the USD/RUR exchange rate. However, from the lower panel of Table 2 , we see that the MosIBOR interest rate is positively related to the bi-currency basket exchange rate and the synthetic interest rate composed of EUR-and USD-denominated LIBOR rates.
The exchange rate policy shift by the CBR has been described as a …rst step toward in ‡ation targeting and a higher independence of domestic interest rates from foreign counterparts. With this in mind, I note that while the introduction of bi-currency basket targeting resulted in a disconnect of the domestic interest rate from the observed USD-related variables, the MosIBOR rate became increasingly dependent on the o¢ cially targeted currency basket and the foreign synthetic interest rate.
The second cointegrating equation in the upper panel exhibits a non-signi…cant relationship between the risk premium and the USD/RUR exchange rate. However, the lower panel results indicate a signi…cant negative relationship between the bi-currency basket and the sovereign risk premium. This may be due to investor concerns caused by the strengthening of the ruble against the basket, which was viewed at that time as fundamental currency overvaluation leading to higher macroeconomic risks.
The "Decoupling" Episode
The The estimates of the …rst equation in Table 3 clearly show the decoupling of Russian money market interest rates from the dollar-denominated LIBOR rates. In the upper panel, the contemporaneous relationship between the MosIBOR and the USD LIBOR rates is negative.
In contrast, the relationship between the MosIBOR and the synthetically composed foreign interest rates in the lower panel is positive but marginally signi…cant. In other words, Russian interest rates became inversely related to the dollar-denominated interest rate and more in sync with the monetary policy cycle of the European Central Bank, which clearly lagged the Fed's more aggressive easing.
A striking di¤erence from the results reported in previous tables can be seen in the second equation. During the "decoupling" episode, both measures of exchange rate and domestic interest rate are strongly positively related. This could be due to the fact that the ruble had become an "investment currency," which made the exchange rate more dependent on capital account ‡ows. During this time, the increase in the cost of external funding was associated with ruble weakening against the USD and the bi-currency basket as predicted by the UIP hypothesis for free ‡oating currencies under free capital mobility.
The sovereign risk premium is not signi…cantly related to either of the two exchange rate measures, which provides yet a further indicator of the divergence between the credit risk and the exchange rate dynamics during this period. Table 3 . Managed ‡oat with bi-currency basket as operating target foreign exchange reserves, the CBR devalued the ruble against the bi-currency basket and conducted a series of key re…nancing rate hikes.
As can be seen from both panels of Table 4 , the long-run beta coe¢ cients exhibit no qualitative di¤erence in terms of signs and statistical signi…cance for the measures of exchange and interest rates. An interesting feature of Table 4 is the similarity of the results to those reported for the USD-targeting sample in Table 1 . While the CBR de jure maintained an adjustable basket pegging policy throughout the crisis episode, it appears the …nancial markets did not see this policy as particularly di¤erent from a managed ‡oat against the US dollar.
The short-term adjustment coe¢ cients i;j for all variables in Table 4 are three to ten times higher than those during the USD-managed ‡oat reported in Table 1 , suggesting that the …nancial variables adjusted faster to cointegrating relationships during the crisis episode. Note: ** Denotes signi…cance at 5% *** Signi…cance at 1%
Post-estimation speci…cation testing
Inference on the estimated parameters depends on the stationarity of the cointegrated equations.
As a check, we predict the cointegrating equations for all four subsamples and graph them over time.
The upper part of Figure 4 plots the …rst predicted cointegrating equation using the esti- 6 Appendix A 
